

UDAC

CONFIDENTIAL

file 1.26.1

3.2.1

## Minutes

Meeting of the Unauthorized Disclosure  
Investigation SubcommitteeTuesday 13 September 1983, 10:00 - 12:00 hours  
Room 7D32, Langley Headquarters BuildingMembers Present

25X1 [ ] Chairman  
25X1 [ ] CIA  
Fred Wirth, USA  
Marion Dana, TREAS/USSS  
Barbara Szymanski, USN  
25X1 [ ] NSA

Alternates Present

Charles Alliman, DOJ  
Author Jones, DOS  
25X1 James Callahan, OSAF [ ]

ALSO PRESENT

25X1 [ ] Chairman, SECOM  
Robert Murray, SECOM  
Robert Curry, SECOM  
25X1 [ ] CIA  
25X1 [ ] CIA

25X1 The Chairman called the meeting to order and read the minutes from the 2 August 1983 meeting. The Subcommittee then proceeded to consider the following items. [ ]

Proposed UDIS Charter: The members reviewed the proposed UDIS charter. In their absence, the Chairman noted that the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) members had suggested that the mission statement in paragraph 1 should be limited to unauthorized disclosures which are the result of "leaks." Discussion ensued. It was noted by the Chairman that the present wording reflected that used in Security Committee Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID). Both the United States Navy (USN) and National Security Agency (NSA) representatives objected that the suggested wording might prove too restrictive. Those present also concurred that the suggested wording may tend to misrepresent the mission of the Subcommittee and agreed that the wording should remain as presented, pending further discussions with OSD and DIA. Should that wording prove to be

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

unacceptable, the members agreed to the following addition to paragraph 1: "The major focus of attention is on analysing and preventing such disclosures." The Subcommittee also agreed to changing the words "sources, methods, and analytic procedures" to "sources and methods and classified intelligence." It was further agreed to change "classified information" to "classified intelligence" as it appears throughout the Charter. [ ]

The members then reviewed paragraph 2 and all subparagraphs therein. After discussion of proposed technical amendments, it was agreed to adopt the language originally presented.

Upon review of paragraph 3, the Subcommittee members concurred in substituting the following language: "Member agencies are responsible for providing to the Subcommittee chairperson information relevant to the Subcommittee's functions."

The Subcommittee then reviewed and approved paragraph 4 and all subparagraphs therein without amendment.

NOTE: Following this meeting the State Department representative telephoned his concurrence to the Charter as approved by the Subcommittee.

The Subcommittee then addressed the written comments presented by the DOJ representative.

Leak Study: The Chairman then announced that three persons had been appointed to serve on the leak study group: [ ] (CIA), [ ] (NSA), and [ ] (DIA). The Subcommittee concurred that as the senior official, [ ] should serve as study director. The Chairman also announced that he and members of the SECOM staff would be meeting with the group on 26 September 1983. The question was then raised concerning whether the Subcommittee should create an advisory board from its own membership to oversee the leak study project. After deliberation, it was decided that issues concerning the project should continue to be raised and resolved by the Subcommittee as a whole at its regular meetings. The Subcommittee members also reaffirmed their commitment to providing full support for the leak study group.

DCI Leak Presentation: [ ] Chairman/SECOM, then presented an update on the DCI's video-taped leak presentation. He noted that it was now in the initial stages of multi-agency distribution at installations throughout the country and that personal representatives traveling with the videotape were reporting a high level of audience interest and concern. [ ] explained that because of this

interest he had requested information regarding community resources devoted to the leak problem. It was at that time that the results of a preliminary survey of the Community leak investigative efforts was distributed. The representatives from the State Department and the Secret Service took the opportunity to update their contribution to the survey. Mr. Leidenheimer thanked the Subcommittee for its prompt response to his inquiries.

USAF Reserve Unit: The Subcommittee Chairman then announced that a USAF Reserve Unit composed of fully cleared CIA personnel had made itself available for weekend details on Agency and Intelligence Community projects. The Chairman invited the members to suggest how this unity could help.

NSDD-84 Nondisclosure Agreement. The Chairman informed the members that no decision had been made regarding whether those who had signed previous versions of the SCI NDA will be required to sign the new one; nor had the Information Security Oversight Office as yet issued guidance on the new collateral NDA. The members then discussed the inquiries of Congress and the Office of Technical Assessment on the prepublication and polygraph provisions of NSDD-84.

The meeting was then adjourned.

UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE  
INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE CHARTER

The Unauthorized Disclosure Investigations Subcommittee operates under the authority of section 2.c and 4 of the Director of Central Intelligence Directive: Security Committee, effective 15 July 1982. In order to better delineate the missions, functions, responsibilities, and organization of the Subcommittee, the following provisions are established.

1. Mission: The Unauthorized Disclosure Investigations Subcommittee will advise and assist the Security Committee in discharging its responsibilities to ensure that programs are developed which protect intelligence sources and methods, and classified intelligence from unauthorized disclosure. The major focus of attention is on analysing and preventing such disclosures.

2. Functions: Under the general guidance of the Security Committee, the Subcommittee will perform the following functions:

a. Advise the Security Committee on security policies and procedures to ensure the implementation of the policies of the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the prevention of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

b. Recommend to the Security Committee policies for the conduct by intelligence community components of security investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

c. Recommend to the Security Committee policies, procedures, and standards regarding those cases of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence or intelligence sources and methods which may appropriately be referred by Federal agencies to the Attorney General for FBI investigation.

d. Recommend to the Security Committee policies, procedures, and standards regarding the application of appropriate legal and administrative sanctions in cases where investigation clearly identifies an employee, contractor or other Federal official who was responsible for an unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence or intelligence sources and methods.

e. Determine and recommend to the Security Committee corrective security measures to preclude the recurrence of disclosure or compromise of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

f. Determine and recommend to the Security Committee methods to increase security education and awareness regarding unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

g. Determine and recommend to the Security Committee improved methods for analyzing unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

h. Determine and recommend to the Security Committee policies and procedures for coordinating investigative efforts on unauthorized disclosures involving more than one department or agency.

i. Undertake those additional functions concerning the unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods as the Security Committee may from time to time direct.

3. Intelligence Community Responsibilities. Members agencies are responsible for providing to the Subcommittee chairperson information relevant to the Subcommittee's function.

4. Composition and Organization.

a. The Subcommittee Chairperson will be appointed by the Chairperson of the Security Committee.

b. The membership of the Subcommittee will be composed of representatives of those government entities represented on the Security Committee.

c. With the consent of affected members, the Subcommittee Chairperson may appoint persons with special skills to provide support to the Subcommittee.

d. There shall be a representative from the Security Committee staff assigned to provide support to the Subcommittee as appropriate. The Subcommittee Chairperson together with the representative from the Security Committee shall coordinate all matters between the Subcommittee and the Security Committee.

e. With the approval of the Security Committee, the Subcommittee Chairperson may invite representatives of relevant United States Government entities to participate from time to time as appropriate.